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1 Introduction: TBD
2 The model and preliminary results
2.1 Firms and consumers
The economy involves one sector supplying a horizontally differentiated good and one production
factor - labor. There is a continuum of unit mass of identical consumers endowed with one unit
of labor. The labor market is perfectly competitive and labor is chosen as the numéraire. The
differentiated good is made available under the form of a finite and discrete number n ≥ 2 of
varieties. Each variety is produced by a single firm and each firm produces a single variety. Thus,
n is also the number of firms. Each firm needs c > 0 units of labor to produce one unit of its
variety. Since wage is normalized to 1, the cost of producing qi units of variety i = 1, ..., n is equal
to cqi.
Consumers share the same additive preferences given by
U(x) =
n∑
i=1
u(xi) (1)
where u(xi) is thrice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and such
that u(0) = 0. The strict concavity of u means that a consumer has a love for variety: when
the consumer is allowed to consume X units of the differentiated good, she strictly prefers the
consumption profile xi = X/n to any other profile x = (x1, ..., xn) such that
∑
i xi = X. Because
consumers are identical, they consume the same quantity xi of variety i = 1, ..., n.
Following Zhelobodko et al. (2012), we define the relative love for variety (RLV) as follows:
ru(x) = −xu
′′(x)
u′(x)
which is strictly positive for all x > 0. Under the CES, we have u(x) = xρ where ρ is a constant
such that 0 < ρ ≤ 1, thus implying a constant RLV given by 1− ρ. Another example of additive
preferences is provided by Behrens and Murata (2007) who consider the CARA utility u(x) =
1 − exp(−αx) where α > 0 is the absolute love for variety; the RLV is now given by αx. Very
much like the Arrow-Pratt’s relative risk-aversion, the RLV measures the intensity of consumers’
variety-seeking behavior.
A consumer’s income is equal to her wage plus her share in total profits. Since we focus on
symmetric equilibria, consumers must have the same income, which means that profits have to be
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uniformly distributed across consumers. In this case, a consumer’s income y is given by
y = 1 +
n∑
i=1
Πi ≥ 1 (2)
where the profit made by the firm selling variety i is given by
Πi = (pi − c)qi (3)
pi being the price of variety i. Evidently, the income level varies with firms’ strategies.
A consumer’s budget constraint is given by
n∑
i=1
pixi = y (4)
where xi stands for the consumption of variety i.
The first-order condition for utility maximization yields
u′(xi) = λpi (5)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier
λ(x, y) =
∑n
j=1 u
′(xj)xj
y
≥ 0. (6)
Therefore, a consumer’s inverse demand for variety i = 1, ..., n is as follows:
pi(x, y) =
yu′(xi)∑n
j=1 u
′(xj)xj
. (7)
2.2 Market equilibrium
The market equilibrium is defined by the following conditions:
(i) each consumer maximizes her utility (1) subject to her budget constraint (4),
(ii) each firm i maximizes its profit (3) with respect to qi (Cournot) or pi (Bertrand),
(iii) product market clearing:
xi = qi for all i = 1, ..., n,
(iv) labor market clearing:
c
n∑
i=1
qi = 1.
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The last two equilibrium conditions thus imply that
x¯ ≡ q¯ ≡ 1
cn
(8)
is the only candidate symmetric equilibrium output. As a consequence, Cournot competition and
Bertrand competition are equally efficient. Observe that this result holds true for any symmetric
and convex preferences. It is also independent of how profits are redistributed. Therefore, the
widely-accepted property in oligopoly theory, which says that price-setters produce more than
quantity-setters at a symmetric equilibrium stems from the absence of labor market considerations.
To be precise, oligopoly models assume implicitly that the labor supply is perfectly elastic. By
contrast, labor supply is perfectly inelastic in our setting.
Between these two extreme cases, there is a continuum of possibilities. For example, when the
labor supply curve has a positive and finite elasticity, firms must pay a higher wage to the workers
they need to produce more. This implies a strictly increasing marginal cost γ(qi). In this case, the
equilibrium consumption and output are given by
x∗ ≡ q∗ ≡ γ−1
(
1
n
)
.
The following proposition summarizes the above discussion.
Proposition 1. Assume that the number of firms is exogenous and that all firms have access
to the same technologies. If the labor supply curve has a positive elasticity and if a symmetric equi-
librium exists, then the equilibrium output is the same under Cournot and Bertrand competition.
The expression (8) has another far-reaching implication. When it is recognized that the income
is endogenous in consumers’ budget constraint, Cournot competition and Bertrand competition
always deliver the first-best outcome when the number of firms is exogenous and the same. Indeed,
x¯ is the equilibrium consumption of a variety when all varieties are priced at their marginal cost.
Note, however, that firms produce the same output under the two competitive regimes does not
imply that firms charge the same price. Therefore, the total income in the economy (GDP) need
not be the same.
Since the product market clearing condition implies that qi = xi for all i, from now on we write
all expressions in terms of xi only. Let
m ≡ p− c
p
be the markup at any symmetric outcome. Then, (2) can be rewritten as follows:
y = 1 +
n∑
j=1
pj − c
pj
pjxj,
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which, after symmetrization, amounts to
y = 1 + nmpx = 1 +my,
where we have used the budget constraint. Therefore, the corresponding income is given by
y =
1
1−m. (9)
3 When Bertrand and Cournot meet Ford
As shown by (5) and (6), the income level influences firms’ demands, whence their profits. As a
result, firms must anticipate accurately what the total income will be. In addition, firms should be
aware that they can manipulate the income level, whence their “true” demands, through their own
strategies with the aim of maximizing profits (Gabszewicz and Vial, 1972). This feedback effect is
known as the Ford effect (d’Aspremont et al., 1996). Unfortunately, as will be shown, proving the
existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in such a context appears to be a hard task (Roberts
and Sonnenschein, 1977).
3.1 Bertrand
Let p = (p1, ..., pn) be a price profile. In this case, consumers’ demand functions xi(p) are obtained
by solving the system of equations (7) where consumers’ income y is now defined as follows:
yB(p) = 1 +
n∑
j=1
(pj − c)xj(p).
It follows from (6) that the marginal utility of income λ is a market aggregate that depends on
the price profile p. Indeed, the budget constraint
n∑
j=1
pjxj(p) = y
B(p)
implies that
λ(p) =
1
yB(p)
n∑
j=1
xj(p)u
′ (xj(p)) . (10)
Since u′(x) is strictly decreasing, the demand function for variety i is thus given by
xi(p) = ξ(λ(p)pi), (11)
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where ξ is the inverse function of u′. Thus, firm i’s profits can be rewritten as follows:
ΠBi (p) = (pi − c)xi(p) = (pi − c)ξ(λ(p)pi). (12)
For any given n ≥ 2, a Bertrand equilibrium is a vector p∗ = (p∗1, ..., p∗n) such that p∗i maximizes
ΠBi (pi,p
∗
−i) for all i = 1, ..., n. This equilibrium is symmetric if p∗i = pB for all i.
Applying the first-order condition to (12) yields
pi − c
pi
= − ξ(λpi)
ξ′(λpi)pi
(
λ+ pi
∂λ
∂pi
) , (13)
which involves ∂λ/∂pi because λ depends on p. Unlike what is assumed in partial equilibrium
models of oligopoly, λ is here a function of p, so that the markup depends on ∂λ/∂pi 6= 0. But
how does firm i determine ∂λ/∂pi?
Since firm i is aware that λ is endogenous and depends on p, it understands that the demand
functions (11) must satisfy the budget constant as an identity. The consumer budget constraint
can be rewritten as follows:
n∑
j=1
pjξ(λ(p)pj) = 1 +
n∑
j=1
(pj − c)ξ(λ(p)pj),
which boils down to
n∑
j=1
ξ(λ(p)pj) = 1/c. (14)
Differentiating (14) with respect to pi yields
ξ′(λpi)λ+
∂λ
∂pi
n∑
j=1
pjξ
′(λpj) = 0
or, equivalently,
∂λ
∂pi
= − ξ
′(λpi)λ∑n
j=1 ξ
′(λpj)pj
. (15)
Substituting (15) into (13) and symmetrizing the resulting expression yields the candidate equi-
librium markup:
m¯BF = − ξ(λp)
ξ′(λp)λp
(
1− 1
n
) = n
n− 1ru
(
1
cn
)
(16)
where we have used the identity
ru(x) ≡ − ξ(λp)
ξ′(λp)λp
.
Proposition 2. Assume that firms account for the Ford effect and that a symmetric equilibrium
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exists under Bertrand competition. Then, the equilibrium markup is given by
m¯BF =
n
n− 1ru
(
1
cn
)
.
Note that ru(1/cn) must be smaller than 1 for m¯BF < 1 to hold. Since 1/(cn) can take on any
positive value, it must be
ru(x) < 1 for all x > 0. (17)
This condition means that the elasticity of a monopolist’s inverse demand is smaller than 1 or,
equivalently, the elasticity of the demand exceeds 1. In other words, the marginal revenue is
positive. However, (17) is not sufficient for m¯BF to be smaller than 1. Here, a condition somewhat
more demanding than (17) is required for the markup to be smaller than 1, that is, ru(1/cn) <
(n− 1)/n. Otherwise, there exists no symmetric price equilibrium. For example, in the CES case,
ru(x) = 1− ρ so that
m¯BF =
n
n− 1(1− ρ) < 1
which means that ρ must be larger than 1/n. This condition is likely to hold because econometric
estimations of the elasticity of substitution σ = 1/(1− ρ) exceeds 3 (Anderson and van Wincoop,
2004).
Using (16) yields the equilibrium price
p¯BF = c
n− 1
n(1− ru
(
1
cn
)
)− 1 (18)
which decreases with n when ru is increasing. Using (9) yields the equilibrium income
y¯BF =
n− 1
n(1− ru
(
1
cn
)
)− 1 .
It can be shown that, for each firm, the second-order condition holds in a neighborhood of (18).1
In other words, p¯BF is always a “local” Bertrand equilibrium. However, we have not been able to
prove that the second-order condition is satisfied globally, and thus the existence of a symmetric
Bertrand equilibrium under the Ford effect remains an open question.
3.2 Cournot
Firm i’s profit may be expressed as follows:
ΠCi (x) =
(
yC
u′(xi)∑n
j=1xju
′(xj)
− c
)
xi (19)
1The proof can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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where
yC = 1 +
n∑
j=1
(pj(x)− c)xj
depends on x. For any given n ≥ 2, a Cournot equilibrium is a vector x∗= (x∗1, . . . , x∗n) such that
x∗i maximizes ΠCi (xi,x∗−i) for all i = 1, ..., n. This equilibrium is symmetric if x∗i = xC for all i.
Accounting for the Ford effect under Cournot competition gives rise to unsuspected implica-
tions. Although we have seen that there is a single symmetric equilibrium output q¯C = 1/cn, the
approach followed above can no longer be applied. Indeed, plugging
yC = 1 +
n∑
j=1
(pj − c)xj
into the budget constraint (4) implies that
n∑
j=1
pjxj = 1 +
n∑
j=1
(pj − c)xj ⇐⇒ 1 = c
n∑
j=1
xj
which yields an expression independent of the price profile p. As a result, any variation in con-
sumers’ expenditure generated by a price change is offset by the same variation in consumers’
income. Therefore, the individual consumption is unaffected by a price change. Therefore, the
equilibrium markup, price and profits are not uniqually determined. To put it differently, there ex-
ists a continuum [0, 1] of equilibrium markups, which generates a continuum of equilibrium prices,
which implies that we do not know at which market price the quantity x¯C is sold. As a conse-
quence, we are unable to find the equilibrium income, and thus the marginal utility of income is
undetermined.
4 Income-taking firms
Since accounting for the Ford effect seems to be a dead-end, we may assume that, although firms
are aware that consumers’ income is endogenous, firms treat this income as a parameter. In other
words, firms behave like income-takers. This approach is in the spirit of Hart (1985) for whom
firms should take into account only some effects of their policy on the whole economy. Note that
the income-taking assumption does not mean that profits have no impact on the market outcome.
It means only that no firm seeks to manipulate its own demand through the income level.
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4.1 Cournot
Since firms are income-takers, we have
∂yC
∂xi
= 0 for all i. (20)
However, firm i manipulates the other terms of (6), which accounts for the strategic interactions
among firms.
Using (20), applying the first-order condition to (19) and using (7) yields
∂ΠCi
∂xi
= pi − c−
[
ru(xi) +
xiu
′(xi) (1− ru(xi))∑n
j=1xju
′(xj)
]
pi = 0. (21)
Lemma 1 in Appendix implies that the first-order conditions are sufficient for the existence of
a Cournot equilibrium, while Lemma 2 implies that any equilibrium is symmetric. Furthermore,
it follows from Proposition 1 that the symmetric equilibrium is unique and given by x¯C = 1/(nc).
Therefore, symmetrizing (21) shows that the only equilibrium markup is given by
m¯C ≡ p
C − c
pC
=
1
n
+
n− 1
n
ru
(
1
cn
)
. (22)
It follows from (17) that m¯C is always smaller than 1. Furthermore, Lemma 1 in Appendix
shows that ΠCi (xi,x−i) is strictly concave in xi if
ru′(x) = −xu
′′′(x)
u′′(x)
= −xp
′′(x)
p′(x)
< 2. (23)
This amounts to assuming that the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand cannot be large,
which rules out the case of inverse demands that are “too” convex (Seade, 1980). The condition
(23) highlights the need to impose restrictions on the third derivative of the utility u to prove the
existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium.
Thus, we have shown:
Proposition 3. Assume that firms are income-takers. If (17) and (23) hold, then x¯C = 1/(nc)
is the unique Cournot equilibrium while the corresponding markup is given by (22).
It follows from (22) that the market price is given by
p¯C =
cn
(n− 1)(1− ru(1/cn)) .
Using (9) shows that the equilibrium income
y¯C =
n
(n− 1)(1− ru(1/cn))
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is well defined. Then, we may use (6) to determine the equilibrium value of the marginal utility
of income, which is now univocally defined.
Finally, both the equilibrium markup, price and income decrease with n when ru is increasing,
which corresponds to the pro-competitive case when the market is governed by monopolistic com-
petition (Zhelobodko et al., 2012). This suggests that the market outcome behaves in a similar
way under these two types of market structure.
4.2 Bertrand
Since firms are income-takers, we have
∂yB
∂xi
= 0 for all i.
Differentiating both sides of the budget constraint
n∑
j=1
pjξ(λ(p)pj) = y
B (24)
with respect to pi, where yB is treated as a parameter, yields the following equation
ξ(λpi) + piξ
′(λpi)λ+
∂λ
∂pi
n∑
j=1
p2jξ
′(λpj) = 0.
Solving this equation with respect to ∂λ/∂pi, we obtain
∂λ
∂pi
= −ξ(λpi) + piξ
′(λpi)λ∑n
j=1 p
2
jξ
′(λpj)
. (25)
Since the first-order condition is still given by (13), we substitute (25) into (13). After sym-
metrization, we then get the candidate equilibrium markup:
m¯B = − ξ(λp)
ξ′(λp)λp
(
1− 1
n
+ ru(x¯)
) = n
n− 1 + ru
(
1
cn
)ru( 1
cn
)
< 1. (26)
Hence, the following result holds true.
Proposition 4. Assume that firms are income-takers. If (17) holds and if a symmetric equi-
librium exists under Bertrand competition, then the equilibrium markup is given by
m¯B(n) =
n
n− 1 + ru
(
1
cn
)ru( 1
cn
)
.
Note that m¯B(n) < 1 when ru < 1. In Appendix, we show that an equilibrium exists under
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the CES (Lemma 3). Therefore, the class of additive preferences for which Proposition 4 holds is
non-empty. Furthermore, it can be shown that, for each firm, the second-order condition holds in
a neighborhood of the symmetric market outcome given by (26),2 and thus our solution is always
a local Bertrand equilibrium.
Using (26) yields the equilibrium price
p¯B = c
n− 1 + ru
(
1
cn
)
(n− 1)(1− ru
(
1
cn
)
)
which need not decrease with n even when ru is increasing. Moreover, the equilibrium income is
given by
y¯B =
n− 1 + ru
(
1
cn
)
(n− 1)(1− ru
(
1
cn
)
)
.
Using (10) thus yields the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of income.
5 Comparing Cournot and Bertrand
Using (22) and (26), we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Assume that firms are income-takers. Then, the equilibrium markups are such
that
m¯C(n) > m¯B(n).
Furthermore, we have:
lim
n→∞
m¯C(n) = lim
n→∞
m¯B(n) = ru(0).
Thus, when the number of income-taking firms is given and the same, Cournot competition
always generates a higher markup than Bertrand competition. This reflects the folk wisdom
according to which Cournot competition is “softer” than Bertrand competition (Vives, 1985, 1999).
Furthermore, as the number of competitors gets very large, both types of oligopolistic competition
delivers very close market outcomes.
Whether the limit of Cournot and/or Bertrand competition is perfect competition (firms price
at marginal cost) or monopolistic competition (firms price above marginal cost) when n is arbi-
trarily large depends on the value of ru(0). More precisely, when ru(0) > 0, a very large number
of firms whose size is small relative to the market size is consistent with a positive markup. This
agrees with Chamberlin (1933). On the contrary, when ru(0) = 0, a growing number of firms al-
ways leads to the perfectly competitive outcome, as maintained by Robinson (1934). To illustrate,
consider the CARA utility given by u(x) = 1 − exp(−αx). In this case, we have ru (0) = 0, and
thus the CARA model of monopolistic competition is not the limit of a large group of firms. By
2The proof can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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contrast, under CES preferences, ru(0) = 1 − ρ > 0. Therefore, the CES model of monopolistic
competition is the limit of a large group of firms.
Using (9) and Proposition 5 yields
lim
n→∞
y¯B(n) = lim
n→∞
y¯C(n) =
1
1− ru(0) > 1.
Therefore, when the number of firms becomes arbitrarily large, total profits are given by
lim
n→∞
nΠ¯(n) = lim
n→∞
y¯ − 1 = ru(0)
1− ru(0) .
In words, because markups need not tend to zero when n goes to infinity, total profits do not
necessarily vanish when the supply side of the market involves a great many firms. More precisely,
total profits are positive if and only if ru(0) > 0.
To be complete, it remains to discuss Bertrand competition with and without the Ford effect.
Comparing p¯BF and p¯B reveals that the market price is higher when firms take the Ford effect
into account than when firms are income-takers. Firms’ profits are higher in the former case than
in the latter. Since profits are redistributed to consumers, the demand functions (11) are shifted
upward when firms account for the Ford effect, thus allowing them to sell the same amount of their
varieties at a higher price, thus giving rise to a higher total income in the economy.
Conclusion:TBD
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Appendix
Lemma 1. Assume that ru′(x) < 2. If firms are income-takers, then ΠCi (xi,x−i) is strictly concave
in xi.
Proof. Setting S ≡∑nj=1 u′(xj)xj, the first-order condition for profit maximization is given by
yC
u′(xi) + u′′(xi)xi
S2
[S − u′(xi)xi]− c = 0. (A.1)
Differentiating S twice,
∂2S
∂x2i
= 2u′′(xi) + u′′′(xi)xi = u′′(xi) (2− ru′(xi)) < 0
because ru′(x) < 2. Therefore, we have
∂2ΠCi
∂x2i
= yC
S − u′(xi)xi
S2
[
∂2S
∂x2i
− 2
S
(
∂S
∂xi
)2]
< 0
because S − u′(xi)xi > 0, which means that ΠCi is strictly concave in xi. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. If ru′(x) < 2, then there exists no asymetric Cournot equilibrium when firms are
income-takers.
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Proof. Assume that the exists a Cournot equilibrium such that xi > xj. It follows from (A.1)
that
u′(xi) + u′′(xi)xi
u′(xj) + u′′(xj)xj
=
S − u′(xj)xj
S − u′(xi)xi . (A.2)
Since ru′(x) < 2, the function u′(x) + u′′(x)x is decreasing. As a result, the LHS of (A.2) is
smaller than 1. Furthermore, it follows from ru(x) < 1 that u′(x)x is increasing. Therefore, the
RHS of (A.2) is larger than 1, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3. Under the CES, ΠBi is strictly concave in pi.
Proof. The statement is proven if the second derivative of ΠBi with respect to pi is negative:
2
∂xi
∂pi
+ (pi − c)∂
2xi
∂p2i
< 0 ⇐⇒ −2pi
xi
∂xi
∂pi
+
pi
∂xi
∂pi
∂
∂pi
(
∂xi
∂pi
)
= 2εi + ηi > 0
where
εi = −pi
xi
∂xi
∂pi
is the price elasticity of xi(p), while
ηi =
pi
∂xi
∂pi
∂
∂pi
(
∂xi
∂pi
)
is the elasticity of the derivative of xi(p).
Under CES preferences, consumers’ demand is given by by
xi(p) =
yBp−σi
P
,
where σ > 1 and P is the price index given by
P =
n∑
j=1
p1−σj .
It is then readily verified that
εi =
σP + (1− σ)p1−σi
P
,
ηi = −(σ + 1)σP
2 − 3(σ − 1)Pp1−σi + 2(σ − 1)2p2(1−σ)i
(σP + (1− σ)p1−σi )P
,
which implies
2εi + ηi =
σ(σ − 1)
(∑
j 6=i p
1−σ
j
)
σ
(∑
j 6=i p
1−σ
j
)
+ p1−σi
> 0.
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Q.E.D.
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